

## Maruyama Masao, Social Scientist

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### Introductory

It is not only an honor to speak to this audience about Maruyama Masao as a social scientist. It is also a pleasure. I can enjoy your familiarity with Maruyama's work; I can speak, as it were, "*entre nous*" about Maruyama, his writings, his ideas, his image and contemporary significance without the elaborate preliminaries that would be necessary in my part of the world. On the other hand, it is also a fact that I come "from the other shore" of the Pacific; the opposite shore of the ocean that Alexander Herzen, in the 1850s, said would be the "Mediterranean of the future." But I dare to hope that such a "friendly otherness" may also have its value.

Among my colleagues I seem to be known as an intellectual historian. Recently, I ran across a Russian saying: *ne slyt', a byt'*: "Be what you are said to be," or "live up to your reputation." For me, today's occasion is a happy test of that injunction. Let me begin with an overview of what I propose to do. Maruyama Masao can be described, I think, in many ways. He was a historian, political thinker, and an intellectual. And he was a social scientist, a bona fide specialist in the field of politics. Today I will be considering Maruyama as a social scientist—a leading social scientist, I will argue, of Japan's postwar era. What did it mean, historically, to have occupied such a position? To this question, I offer a three-fold response. As a leading social scientist, Maruyama was at the same time only one social scientist among many. First, I will try to situate his work in this domain among the intellectual currents, particularly Marxism and what is frequently termed "modernism" (*kindaishugi*), that dominated Japanese social science after 1945. To say that Maruyama was a leading figure means that in a

substantial way, he set the direction of those currents, that he shaped the self-understanding of his age. Maruyama's public life, furthermore, coincided with the high tide of social science across the industrialized world, particularly the United States. A second purpose of my talk, therefore, will be to assess Maruyama's response to American social science, both its contributions and practitioners: because it was the way he responded to it, I think, that allowed him to distinguish himself among many fellow workers, some of them brilliant, in the social sciences. As a leading and representative social scientist of postwar Japan, Maruyama has—over time—come to be known outside Japan, most widely but not only in the United States. So I would like, finally, to discuss how Maruyama has been interpreted by readers of his work in the English-speaking world. Through this three-fold inquiry, whose elements will be interwoven as I proceed, I hope to be able shed light not only on Maruyama's own work, but also on the role played by social science *in* Japan, and by Japanese social science in the unfolding drama of “the modern” that constitutes the shared history of our world.

#### Japanese social science as history

Almost twenty years ago, somewhere in the course of writing my doctoral dissertation on the “public man” in imperial Japan, I noticed that for Japan's intellectuals in the 1920s and especially after 1945, the phrase “social science” seems to have been invested with an almost magical power. If properly conceived and put into practice, “social science” might actually solve some of the enormous problems then facing Japan and its people. In the 1920s, these had mainly to do with poverty, inequality, and rural overpopulation; under the radically changed conditions brought by defeat and occupation, the tasks laid upon social science included the wholesale democratization of the political and social order itself. What was the relation between the tasks of the 1920s and those of the early postwar era? What significance was to be attributed to the intervening war and defeat? However these questions were to be answered, there seemed little doubt that they *could* be and that Japanese society would improve as a result.

What I had noticed, in short, was the *self-image* of “social science” as a uniquely powerful set of ideas and practices. Yet once examined, this image of a single “great vehicle,” seemed to dissolve into particulars. “Social science” was also “the social sciences,” not one discipline or group, but many; and they were fractious and territorial. Where had they come from? How did they acquire their personalities as professional disciplines? As such, what fates did they encounter? By the same token, if there

were moments of critical unity, why and how did they occur? My hope was to write a synthetic history that would explore the interplay of unifying and particularizing impulses in Japanese social science. I would trace the entrances, movements and exits of various disciplines as *dramatis personae* on the intellectual stage, while tying those developments into the convulsed history of the society and polity in which they were embedded.

I did realize that goal, though only partially, and after too many years of work. Earlier this year I published *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions*. This book is my best attempt to think through the broader problems that underlie my strong interest in Maruyama Masao—or should I say, the broader problems I became aware of *because* I had encountered Maruyama’s work.

I begin by describing the historical setting for the professional practice of social science in general (that is, not only in Japan) ; in doing so I adopt Immanuel Wallerstein’s characterization of social science as “an enterprise of the modern world... [whose] roots lie in the attempt, full-blown since the sixteenth century, and part and parcel of the construction of our modern world, to develop systematic, secular knowledge about reality that is somehow validated empirically.”<sup>1</sup> The theme, broadly speaking, is that of “development,” or “rationalization“ (to use Max Weber’s term), and the various forms of modernity that such development has engendered. My hypothesis is that the form assumed by social science in a given national setting is closely bound up with the institutional path to modernity taken by that nation.

More specifically, I argue that Japan, together with Germany and pre-revolutionary Russia, represented the three most consequential forms of “developmental alienation” from the “Atlantic Rim” symptomatic of late-emerging empires. Although each had retained control of its polity and politics, a sense of “lateness” or “backwardness” (as indicated by their large agrarian populations) substantially conditioned their historical and cultural self-image. “Developmental alienation,” then, refers to a perceived condition of vulnerability to the cultural, or virtual, imperialism of the “advanced” world that was also the model for the development projects that each of these nations had pursued. The alienation was *developmental* because the “Atlantic Rim” included prime

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1 Immanuel Wallerstein et al., *Open the Social Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p.2.

models of development already attained and thus to be striven for by others; development was *alienated*, because each “model country” was also a potential or actual threat and a constant reminder of material difference and lack, of existence as an object of condescension, contempt, or reciprocal fear. This condition, or predicament, I believe, was the primary, if not the only, determinant of the social science generated in each of these settings.

After establishing this broad context, I offer an overview of Japanese trends from the 1890s onward, and then get to heart of the matter: detailed treatments of two of the most powerful streams of professional social science. One is associated with Marxism in its various schools (that is, the so-called *Kôza-ha*, *Rônô-ha*, and particularly the Uno school) ; the other with what in Japan is termed *kindaishugi* (rather than *modanizumu*), whose most representative figure is undoubtedly Maruyama Masao, but includes such figures as Ôtsuka Hisao and Kawashima Takeyoshi. I try to show how the problematics associated with “developmental alienation” affected both of these currents in Japanese social science, and I argue that in succession, these two sets of thought have provided Japanese social science with those moments of critical unity it has thus far experienced. I see no such unity at present, and do not know what the future will bring.

Now, I don't claim to know whether “unity” is always best for intellectual life. “Unity” has its price, and everything depends on the political and institutional conditions under which that unity is secured. But I also think that the achievements of the writers in the Marxist-modernist current of Japanese social science were very considerable. This is because they sought to face the central issue of their time: the gap between the rich and poor countries of the world, and between city and country within society after society, including that of Japan, in all of its political, social, and cultural ramifications. As Uchida Yoshihiko, a close contemporary and friend of Maruyama, said, “for me, the solution to poverty remains the fundamental problem for social science.”<sup>2</sup> Critiques of those achievements are vitally needed, but at least to me they have yet to reach fully the intellectual level of their target. If the account I offer in my book, or my tone today, sounds like a requiem for an age of intellectual heroes, if it bears traces of elegy, this judgment is the reason.

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2 Uchida Yoshihiko, *Dokusho to shakai kagaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1985), p. 105.

Yet more is involved than personal retrospection or scholarly taste. Between the beginning and the end of the 1960s, Japanese society underwent fundamental transformations. It is difficult to overstate how important these were. By the end of that decade, Japan's society was definitively urban and "mass" -based in a way it had never been. The "problem of the villages" no longer had a unifying salience in social thought. The scale of corporate dominance over the national life was also unprecedented, as was Japan's share of world trade; the "poverty" of which Uchida spoke had changed shape and location. All of this was justified in the ideological sphere by combining a traditionalizing rhetoric of service to the enterprise "community" with a post-1945 ethos of democratized equality. The latter had its basis in the actual shrinking of the gap between rich and poor, relative to prewar society; to that extent, according to some arguments from the left, the Marxists and modernists themselves must be seen as "complicit" in the formation of the postwar "social contract," no less so than the "neo-Japanists" who later elevated the country to the status of industrial utopia with world-historical significance.

#### Universal and Particular

So: what has it meant to be a "social scientist" in modern Japan? What is the milieu out of which Maruyama emerged? One way to answer this question is to follow the procedure of the book, and to outline what I call the five "moments" in the historical unfolding of professional social science in Japan, with their starting points. Following a significant "prehistory" of intense Westernization, these include: the "neo-traditional" science of nationality or Japaneseness (mid-late Meiji) ; the "universalist" or liberal (the Taishō era) ; the Marxist (late 1920s) ; the early postwar "modernist," which gives way to the discourse of modernization (*kindaikaron*) ; and finally the more recent "culturalist." From this perspective, we can describe Maruyama as a combined product of the middle three, and committed critic of the first and last, to which he was nevertheless existentially bound; together they form a dialectic of *Sein* and *Sollen*, perhaps (to speak loosely) of ideology and utopia, that gives his work such dynamism. But I would prefer, because I think it is more illuminating, to address the question more thematically: by situating Maruyama in terms of his relation to the great, overarching, conceptual preoccupation of *all* Japanese social science. This is the issue of universal versus particular.

Here are two phrases that capture what I mean. First: "A small country out in the sticks" – *henpi no shōhō*; second: "a piece of the larger world" – *sekai no ikkan*. These

were used to describe Japan, the first in the thirteenth century by the great Zen master Dōgen, and the second by Tosaka Jun, a Marxist philosopher of the twentieth.<sup>3</sup> For Dōgen, the comparison of Japan to India and China was not flattering. His country seemed to him a peripheral land of the willfully ignorant, and lacking in wisdom. Yet the Buddhist law, despite or because of this deficiency, had made its way east, and Japan had now been brought to share in the religious destiny of the civilized world. For Tosaka, matters may have seemed the same. Capitalist development and the revolutionary response it engendered had sent a historical tide from west to east, from England and France to Russia, and perhaps now to Japan and China. Vividly aware of the delusory ideology of Japan's national uniqueness, which he took as one of his targets, Tosaka sought to clear the path for Japan's own transformation. For both of these thinkers, the "real" world was not the unprepossessing land of their birth, but rather the globe, or that part of it caught up in the universal movements of their time.

The theme of the mediation of the universal to the particular (or of the "great" to the "small") encapsulates the history of Japanese social science well enough; to "think the world" of modernity and Japan's late incorporation into it has been its consistent and inherent concern. But this is only part of the story. For along with it has come a counter-movement, an inversion, a transvaluation. Could not Japan itself be "great"? Could not the historical tide, whether of Buddhism or modernity, reach its completion in Japan? Was it not the particular that in fact had to be mediated to the universal so that the universal itself could be realized? Was not Japan the uniquely necessary particular that troubled every claim to universality—in religion, in socio-economic development, in political forms? In other words, as Japan universalized, the world would be particularized. Now, to some this will call up echoes of the Kyoto School of philosophy, or perhaps of the interconnected wartime discourses of "overcoming the modern" and "Japan and the standpoint of world history." Or, it may be a reminder of the more recent, less grandiose (and less tainted) notion of "*ie*-society as a civilization." This, you will recall, was propounded rather energetically in the 1970s. The point is that such discourses are not to be dismissed as mere ideological excrescences of their respective moments. Japan's "success" as the first modern power in Asia was historically unprecedented. As to its significance, as Zhou Enlai is said to have remarked

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3 Dōgen, *Shōbōgenzō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko ed., 1999), vol.2, p.118; Tosaka Jun, *Sekai no ikkan toshite no Nihon* (1937), *Tosaka Jun zenshū* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1967), vol.5.

about the French Revolution, it may still be “too early to tell.”

In any case, I try to understand the broader significance of the universal-particular relation in Japanese social science within the framework of “developmental alienation.” It was as a response to this condition that the strategy of neo-traditional rationalization, of modernizing through tradition, was elaborated over the decades from the 1880s to the 1910s. This strategy was described lucidly by none other than Itô Hirobumi himself, in a (ghost-written?) essay he contributed to the famous volume, *Fifty Years of New Japan* (*Kaikoku gojûnenshi*) ; an equally lucid critical *inversion* can be found in Maruyama’s works, most notably “Chôkokkashugi no ronri to shinri” and the first essay in *Nihon no shisô*. The British historian of Japan, W. G. Beasley, has recently provided a more neutral, perhaps one could say “*shibui*,” presentation of the neo-traditionalist strategy:

The Meiji Restoration, as it is called, not only overthrew the Tokugawa, as China’s revolutionaries overthrew the Manchus nearly fifty years later, but also brought to power a group of men who were dedicated to the aim of expanding the country’s wealth and strength. What they meant by this was to combine government and military structures in the western manner with modern industry, traditional ideology and a *minimum of social change*. It proved to be a durable formula.<sup>4</sup>

A “durable formula,” indeed. The formative years of Japanese social science—of academic social thought more generally—were stamped with the hegemony of the family state. This state became the prohibitively favored reference point for any and all attempts to think systematically about Japan’s emergent modernity. To serve it was by definition to serve the cause of national progress. The vector of national service was very powerful; thinkers who were alienated in mind might be restored to the national community if they could see that their personal and private estrangement would exacerbate the nation’s own collective alienation from the “advanced” world. Simply put, an objectively alienated Japan could not afford the presence within itself of subjectively alienated individuals. By the same token, social solidarities that were not aligned with the nation were dangerous to the nation. But what happens when the “nation” itself becomes dangerous to the people who make it up?

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4 W. G. Beasley, *The Japanese Experience* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), p.xvii. Emphasis added.

## Legacies of the Kôza-ha

When reified, neither the position of one-way universalization, nor of perennial particularity, is really tenable. Yet these two categories need not be simply mirror images of one another, mutually dependent and mutually defining. The case of Japanese Marxism, to which I now turn, bears eloquent testimony to this. In cognizing its object—Japanese capitalism—the so-called Kôza-ha or “Lectures Faction” Marxism was both universalist and particularist in precisely the same degree. Japanese capitalism was classified as inherently, structurally deviant, and only the *deus ex machina* of an external shock could alter it. Mechanistic rather than dialectical in its apprehension of change, Kôza-ha Marxism tended to reproduce conceptually that to which it was morally and politically most opposed: the world of the “national polity” and the real conditions of exploitation that underlay the imperial regime. If the *kokutai* was “peerless throughout the world,” Japanese capitalism, with its “semi-feudal regime of parcelized cultivation,” was likewise “peerless throughout the world...in its baseness and cruelty.”<sup>5</sup>

This was strong stuff, but it suffered from a kind of conceptual immobilism, and resulted in what we may call an intellectual “equilibrium trap.” That did not, however, prevent the work of Yamada Moritarô from acquiring a protean character: though fiercely criticized, Yamada’s *Nihon shihonshugi bunseki*, published in 1934, was widely influential, far beyond Marxist circles, and well into the postwar era. The difference between the “national politarians” and Yamada was not just that the one’s rendering was positive and the other negative; it was that the former conceived of the *kokutai* ontologically, while for Yamada capitalism was to be apprehended methodologically. But as Yamada understood, the very notion of methodology was antithetical to the ontological myth of *kokutai*. As long as this was borne in mind, there was a way out of the trap. Yamada’s analysis of Japan’s capitalism, its “semi-feudal” base and superstructure, shaped the understanding of a generation and more of social scientists as they confronted the issue of what made Japanese capitalism both Japanese and capitalist. By the same token, the *itinerarium mentis* of thinkers broadly in the Kôza-ha line—Uchida Yoshihiko, whom I mentioned earlier, his close friend Hirata Kiyooki, the economic historian Ôsuka Hisao, and above all Maruyama Masao—demonstrates both the difficulty of transcending the Kôza-ha perspective, and the

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5 Yamada Moritarô, *Nihon shihonshugi bunseki* (1934), in *Yamada Moritarô chosakushû*, vol.2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984), p.151 (Iwanami Bunko ed., p.215).



intellectual possibilities that open up upon so doing. Uchida and Hirata, for example, developed a notion of *civil society* that could only have emerged as the antithesis to particularism, and only in resistance to the imperial state, which claimed to function as the ontological locus of moral values. With the implosion of that structure after 1945, “civil society” itself should no longer have required the protective mantle of a mechanistic economism. But only after sloughing off the ideological control of the communist party (the organizational foundation, after all, of Kōza-ha Marxism) was “civil society” finally freed to display the *ethico-political character* it had always covertly possessed, and yet remain within the ambit of Marxism rather than being excluded as heretical.

### Maruyama and the Modern

Maruyama’s course was somewhat different. As with Uchida and Hirata, he made a critical response *through* Marxism to the neo-traditionalist discourse of the “family state” and “national community.” Like them, he zeroed in on what he saw as Marxism’s crucial flaw: that it lacked an adequate, integral understanding of the individual human subject in social context; a grasp of how motivations, psychological drives and dispositions, and value concerns played out in the domain of collective action. In the famous “debate on subjectivity” (*shutaisei ronsō*) in which he was an active participant, Maruyama had complained that “every time the word ‘ethos’ or ‘subject’ has come up, my name gets trotted out.”<sup>6</sup> “Ethos,” of course, connoted “values”; it reminds us of Maruyama’s early exposure to neo-Kantian ethical theories, his immersion in the work of Karl Mannheim and Max Weber.<sup>7</sup> And we are well reminded, by Hiraishi Naoaki among others, that for Maruyama, Fukuzawa Yukichi was not just an object of study but directly shaped his “gut feelings” about what made a “modern” personality.

Yet, as a number of interpreters have noted, Maruyama himself was somewhat uncomfortable with the notion of civil society. There is no question that he grasped the essence of the concept, as witness the following note in his posthumously published *Jikonai taiwa*: “A society in which the haberdasher’s son, when asked what he wants to be, says, the best tailor in the country, no, in the world—that is civil society. A society

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6 “Zadankai: Yuibutsu shikan to shutaisei” (*Sekai*, Feb. 1948), repr. in Hidaka Rokurō, ed., *Kindaishugi* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1964), p.143.

7 See Maruyama, *Jikonai taiwa* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1998), p.243.

in which a first-rate haberdasher is held in greater esteem than a second- or third-rate politician, official, or professor—that is civil society.”<sup>8</sup>

There is room for debate about Maruyama’s attitude as it developed over the decades from the late 1930s to the 1990s. It would be strange indeed if, as an active thinker, he had maintained a total consistency in vocabulary or emphasis, even if his fundamental commitments remained firm. But there is no room for doubt that he invested the idea of *modernity* with as potent an intellectual and moral charge as he could muster: and that modernity, though it necessarily arose amid historical particularity, for Maruyama also transcended any particularity. “To understand others as others” —*in ihrem Anderssein*—was not merely a prelude to their assimilation into self. It was by definition to experience individual and collective self-transcendence, to become “other” in and as oneself.<sup>9</sup> Social science, in other words, was concerned with the theory and practice of this-worldly transcendence. Its task was to promote the knowing, willed rejection of collective political ontology, of “naturalized” identity, in favor of a necessarily conflictual, but negotiable process of individual and social self-determination. The process of solving such issues by negotiation formed the essence of what it meant to be modern. And to the extent that “being modern” entailed political and not only economic action, Maruyama could not rest content with the category of civil society, even in the admirable form that Uchida and Hirata gave to it.

Let us meditate briefly on the “fate” Maruyama’s “modern” ideal. For almost two decades after 1945, and amid long bouts of serious illness, Maruyama had pursued dual intellectual projects: his “main office” had always been his research, writing, and teaching on East Asian political thought, while the journalism, occasional essays, participation in round-tables, political speeches, manifestoes, and (as Fukuda Kan’ichi notes) political science proper, belonged to what he called his “side business.”<sup>10</sup> It was the “side business,” of course, that led observers to describe Maruyama, immediately after the war, as a “comet.” This is a cliché, I know, and it’s a pretty image, but it

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8 Maruyama Masao, *Jikonai taiwa*, p.146.

9 See Maruyama, “Politics and Man in the Contemporary World” (1961) in id., *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.348. See also Maruyama, *Jikonai taiwa*, pp.86–87, 242.

10 See Fukuda Kan’ichi, *Maruyama Masao to sono jidai*, Iwanami Booklet, no.522 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), p.48; also Maruyama, *Jikonai taiwa*, p.76.

seems somehow less than adequate in this case. I've never seen a comet, but does it actually light up the entire sky, throwing every detail of the landscape below into the sharpest, indelible relief? Does the world simply look different after the "comet" is gone? Does a "comet" cause the scales to fall from the eyes of those who see it? That is what Maruyama's essay on "ultranationalism" did. As one who came to Maruyama's work through a reading of that essay, I can say that my understanding of Japan was never the same after that. But that is not the real point here. For Maruyama's original readers, it was not their understanding of a "Japan" out there, but of themselves, that was at issue in that essay. At that moment, the act of writing about history (or culture) and of writing about politics were existentially bound, in a way that they ceased to be before very long. This was not because they were in fact unrelated, but because, under the ideological conditions of the 1950s, people were increasingly led to think that "politics" was the preserve of professionals—electoral politicians, officials—just in the same way that the operation of the economy, or of the corporations that dominated it, had become too complex for anyone but the professional expert to handle. The world had been made safe for culture, for the enjoyment of peace and stability. This was the great paradox, Maruyama argued, of the so-called "*Zeitalter der Politisierung* [*seijika no jidai*]" that had been ascendant in the twentieth century: as the "state" insinuated itself ever more deeply into the daily life of society, people (the "mass") felt themselves actually less and less concerned with it—until it was too late.

When I think about this now, the time-frame seems somehow a little "off" ; I think of Japanese society in the 1950s as acutely self-conscious politically, especially compared to the decades that followed. In sounding this alarm, was Maruyama simply being prophetic, or I am looking at an unrepresentative sample? In any event, he sought to explain this paradox, and to counteract it. He poured enormous energy, unreserved intellectual blood, sweat, and tears, into this effort. It was an incredibly urgent task, he felt, for the study of politics in Japan to become scientific. As far as he could see, there was "no tradition worth reviving" of political science in Japan.<sup>11</sup>

### The American Connection

In order to understand the "world of politics" —this is the title of a wonderful little

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11 Maruyama, "Politics as a Science in Japan" (1947), in id., *Thought and Behavior*, p.226.

book he published in 1952—Maruyama drew fairly heavily on American social science, especially political science.

Now, we are all used to hearing about the conservative implications—and more than implications, the sometimes overt prescriptiveness—of what is held to be Parsonian functionalism, for example. American social science seems to have been obsessed with identifying, identifying with, and reproducing normality, tautologically defined as what was consistent with consensus American values. Robert Bellah has ruefully noted the optimism, even “euphoria,” that reigned over American social science in the first decade after 1945. The road to the “good society” lay wide open. Yet in that same moment, Maruyama wrote of McCarthyism as American fascism—the contemporary form of “counter-revolution” in a society that has managed “to preserve a high degree of cultural and ideological homogeneity.” Rather than the “tenseness of the revolutionary situation” that theoretically ought to have provoked a fascist reaction, for Maruyama, American society was manifesting a kind of paranoia in the face of any heterogeneity, feeding on its own reified fears.<sup>12</sup> So of what use could a “euphoric” American political science be?

One key to a response may be found in the fact that Maruyama had read, with enormous care, the works of Harold Lasswell, the leading light in the second generation of the “Chicago school” of political science. I hasten to add that I am not a student of this school or of political science in general. But there is a series of striking affinities—paired with differences—between Maruyama and Lasswell that I would like to note. First, the origin of their respective concerns in the 1930s, a period of profound discontent among the “actually existing” liberal democracies; second, their view of society as increasingly defined by the division between elite and mass, and their concern with the psychology of those elites (and to some extent of the “mass”), extending to the application of psychopathological categories to analyze their motivations and behavior; third, the understanding of politics as an essentially conflictual process by which social goods or “values” are allocated through the intervention of legitimate power—that is what political power is for—combined with the vivid perception that propaganda and the manipulation of symbols are central to modern politics. One notes here that Maruyama’s frequent invocation of a “conflict of values” bridges Lasswell’s empirical, “value-free” conception and his own more Kantian understanding

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12 Maruyama, “Fascism—Some Problems” (1952), id., *Thought and Behavior*, pp. 163–65.

of the notion of value. I somehow suspect that Lasswell's willingness to define democracy as "the dictatorship of palaver," a regime just as much in need of propaganda as fascism or communism, would not sit entirely well with Maruyama; I do not think he was that cynical. Nor did he adopt the tone of authoritative swagger that oozes from Lasswell's prose; Maruyama was not elitist to that degree, and certainly did not look to technocracy as the disinterested savior of modern mass society.

Maruyama did indeed share with Lasswell the understanding that political power is a value, an end to be pursued (by some). In *Seiji no sekai*, Maruyama presents dual schemas, one of "conflict" leading to "solution," and another representing the reproductive circuit of power. Both are explicitly modeled on the double circuits of capital formulated by Marx, one proceeding from use value, the second from exchange value. That is, the analysis of politics must simultaneously treat both political situations—the particular conflicts over values and attempts (or failures) to solve them—and the dynamics of power in itself.

Maruyama followed American political science closely for some time: think of his treatment of "patterns of individuation" in the experience of modernization, or the increasing prominence of input-output, or cybernetic analysis, in his writings of the 1960s. "Speaking in schematic terms," Maruyama once observed, "in modern society the determination of the state's policy can be regarded as a cycle in which effective demand on the part of society—not simply economic demand in the narrow sense, but demands for various values including information, technics, distinction and so forth—is placed into the political system, with the generation of policy as output to 'society'"<sup>13</sup> (I wonder if it is not too farfetched to associate these "system" -analyses with Maruyama's fondness for stereo equipment, and his fondness for metaphors such as *haichi tenkan* in describing the transformation of thought systems.)

But there is another side to the American connection. Democracy was the American ideology, its normality. Its cant, its hypocrisy, its superficial open-handedness, were all premised on that normality.

But that had not been the case in Japan; for Maruyama, democracy in Japan, that is, democracy as a serious possibility, was new. Japanese society was not yet "normal,"

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13 Maruyama, statement in Maruyama Masao, Umemoto Katsumi, and Satō Noboru, *Sengo Nihon no kakushin shisō* (Tokyo: Gendai no Rironsha, 1983), p.359.

and it was debatable that merely applying American-style analyses of politics to postwar Japanese institutions would make them so. That would bespeak instead a kind of perverted “idealism.” The real task of grasping democratic “control” of the mechanisms of government required the ceaseless intervention into politics of mobilized, non-political society; it required the action, not the “behavior,” of voluntary associations. As acid a critic of American conformism as he may have been, Maruyama understood the activism of voluntary associations to be the absolute *sine qua non* of a modern democracy. If I may borrow a term from the political scientist Karl Deutsch, Maruyama may have seen such action as the sole means of collective “grace” that can intervene to rescue a modern political regime that, as complex systems inevitably do, lurches toward breakdown; elites, technocrats, regular politicians cannot do that.<sup>14</sup> That form of normality, what Bellah describes as “Calvinism from below,” was radical in the Japanese context, and something Maruyama profoundly desired for Japan. Calls for it run through all of his writings on politics, from the late 1940s onward. And they are accompanied (as in *Seiji no sekai*, for example), by a highly realistic assessment of the costs, both of revolution, and of wars pursued by ruling classes hoping to avoid it. “It is far more preferable for a society to evolve in such a way that it can eliminate social injustice without violent revolution.”<sup>15</sup> But if it cannot, my suspicion is that Maruyama saw revolution as the painful price of historical progress. And he did believe in that.

### Maruyama after ANPO

I do not need to recount, of course, Maruyama’s role in the 1960 ANPO. Let us just say that he put his money where his mouth is; or, in the words of the Russian proverb, he *was* in fact what he was *believed to be*. At that time, Maruyama made his famous “bet on the sham of postwar democracy,” but he lost. Unwilling to accept “income doubling” as a substitute or compensation, Maruyama was differentially written off by those who had engineered that policy and supported it academically. As this was occurring, the first critique of Maruyama from the post-ANPO left was produced by

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14 See Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), pp. 236-40; and discussion in Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p.241f. Maruyama was acquainted with Deutsch, a late-1930s refugee scholar from Hitler’s Germany. Maruyama clearly had a great deal in common with such figures, more than he did with those educated solely in the United States.

15 Maruyama, *Seiji no sekai* (1952), in *Maruyama Masao shû* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), vol.5, p.179. See also Maruyama, *Jikonai taiwa*, p.90.

Yoshimoto Takaaki (1962) ; this was his well-known *Maruyama Masao ron*. At the end of the decade, Yamamoto Yoshitaka, a major figure in Zenkyōtō, followed up in *Chisei no hanran* (1969). In this polemic, the ethic of “doing” over “being” advanced in *Nihon no shisō* was turned against Maruyama, who stood accused of “retreating” into procedural formalism for refusing to accede to student demands for self-criticism. By clinging to the “being” of forms and structures, the argument ran, Maruyama had proven that his advocacy of revolutionary personal autonomy and praxis was disingenuous. The imputation of bad faith is, I think, ludicrous; but the “charge” that Maruyama attached greatest importance to argument (even knock-down, drag-out argument—what Tetsuo Najita calls “doing *shōbu*”) following accepted rules, and simply refused any demand based on coercion, is perfectly valid. The physical effects on Maruyama of his treatment by *enragé* students, as is well known, were quite damaging and hastened his retirement. This episode may also—though there is no direct textual evidence—have deepened his pessimism about the capacity for the conscious, revolutionary *self-transformation* of Japanese society. If that is the case, while Maruyama still might have needed to be aware of the world of *politics*, he would have had little need to keep up with the world of political *science*.

At some level, for Maruyama the convulsions in the university system must have been inexplicable. His contempt for the “Nazi-like” behavior of those who attacked him was on the record. Whether it was fair of him to use such an expression or not, for him, there could be no stronger expression of disdain.<sup>16</sup> In any case, it must have been a bitter thing to see his ideal of democracy as permanent revolution thus reduced. But the experience did not drive him into a defense of the status quo; his politics remained what they had been, that is, independent and left-internationalist (rather than loftily cosmopolitan). Instead, from that point and well into the 1980s, Maruyama’s work was preoccupied with the “deep things” of Japan’s history, in particular with what he successively termed the “prototype,” “ancient substrate” (*kosō*), and finally the basso ostinato, that operated in various dimensions of archaic Japanese consciousness.

Although Maruyama was regarded by some interpreters (including disappointed friends) as having made a virtual “return to Japan,” I believe that it was Maruyama’s ongoing concern with democratic revolution as a world-historical process, his attempt

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16 See Maruyama, *Jikonai taiwa*, p.242.

to foster the development of a self-aware and self-activating mass citizenry in Japan, and his sense of the fearsome obstacles to that development, that determined his turn to the ancient and “deep things” of consciousness. The subterranean continuities that Maruyama drew from the traces of Japanese historical, ethical, and political discourse were meaningful not so much in themselves but in terms of their implications for the possibility, or otherwise, of revolutionary transformation. It was the “universal” that gave meaning to the “particular,” movement to stasis, and utopia to “reality.”

It will not satisfy every critic to be told that the later Maruyama was increasingly pessimistic, that he wrote of the “ancient substrate” out of desperately disappointed hopes. The sympathetic (or optimistic) will note that Maruyama’s final major work, his exposition of Fukuzawa’s *Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (1986), is in the manner of a *ressourcement*. But though the intellectual struggle might continue, the world had changed. Compared to the 1960 ANPO, the end-of-decade protests and violence were premised on acceptance of the argument that Japan’s postwar democracy was not just a sham, but one not worth even the paradoxical defense— “it is real because it is a fiction” —that Maruyama had mounted. Or, worse, as the decades of growth wore on, it was taken as a given, unproblematic reality.

The regnant line of “Maruyama-critique” now seems most troubled by his sturdy sense of nationality; indeed by the entity of the nation-state as such. Yamanouchi Yasushi argues that beginning with his wartime writings (particularly the final chapter of his *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*), Maruyama essentially pursued a rationalization of nationalism, a project held to be continuous across the divide of 1945. And in a sense it was: as Maruyama wrote in “Nationalism in Japan” (1951), “nationalism must be rationalized in the same degree that democracy is irrationalized.” If we hold only to the first clause, we do encounter a Maruyama “complicit” in the formation of the postwar order. Indeed Yamanouchi has described Maruyama (among others) as a “thinker of the 1955 system.”<sup>17</sup> But what about the “irrationalization of democracy”? It seems to me ill-advised to sever the two themes when discussing Maruyama, and that there is no warrant for ascribing greater weight to the former over the latter in assessing his thought or the character of postwar modernism. This is especially important because of the crucial role played by resis-

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17 See Yamanouchi Yasushi, “Sengo hanseiki no shakai kagaku to rekishi ninshiki,” *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 689 (October 1996) :32-43, esp. p.41.



tance to illegitimate authority in Maruyama's conception of citizenship. This is doubtless a matter for debate, but my belief is that a moment of resistance to such authority was never absent from Maruyama's thought. The operation of political judgment for Maruyama, as with conscience for Ôtsuka Hisao, did not, could not, lead only to spontaneous or autonomous obedience. Otherwise the very notion of subjective autonomy was truly a sham.

Clearly, however, Maruyama *was* a thinker of the nation: it was the modal form of political existence in the world he experienced, studied, and imagined. To be sure, he regarded "Japaneseness" as an ethnic identity, overwhelmingly dominant, within the political territory called Japan. But it should go without saying that he was viscerally suspicious of any appeals to "blood" or other primordial ties as the unmediated basis for unity or collective action. And he was for that reason a thinker of the state, which he believed had become the general condition for social continuity in the contemporary world. Finally, Maruyama was—or became—a thinker of culture, and especially of cultures in contact. "The West" and "Japan" were real to him, if contradictory within themselves, but in any case not simply nominalist phantasms. For Maruyama, Japan's modern intellectual history was defined by the cultural rupture of westernization; this was itself the first act in the drama of universalization. Whatever and however many the shared predicaments of modernity may be, the cultural cleavage experienced by Japan and other nations outside the west decisively differentiated their histories from those of Euro-America. The legacies of that rupture—and of the asymmetries of power that engendered it—were ineradicable. And there was, enduringly in Maruyama's thought, the despairing sense that the patterned recurrence of a historical consciousness that recognized only "the eternal now" might never be "overcome." It may not be wrong to see in this despair a highly sophisticated and refined expression of that same stubborn particularism that both unified and bemused the main line of Japanese Marxists. But Maruyama was enough of a neo-Kantian to believe that even in such a situation, a space—of transcendence, of "grace"—could be opened between power and culture, or between politics and identity. It was only here, he believed, that a genuinely universal social science—a systematic knowledge "of the other as other"—could be sought and found. I think he was right: apart from social science (or social wisdom) in this sense, what other means have we to help society restrain its narcissism and violent impulses, and unlock its capacity for self-transformation and renewal?

## Coda

Well, I fear I have overstayed my welcome. I had promised to speak about how Maruyama was read in the English-speaking world. I could say that I am one example and leave it at that. But if you will indulge me, I will add a few words in this regard, and then stop.

First, I discovered the other day that there are more than 350 references to Maruyama's writings on Amazon.com. But a look at these shows that Maruyama is read almost exclusively within the context of "Japanese studies," which, academically speaking, is a *chūshō kigyō* among area studies groups in the United States. There is a small critical literature on Maruyama, which is growing in sophistication. To some degree it replicates the sharper critiques of Maruyama familiar in Japan since he passed away, but sometimes without sufficiently examining his ideas. But in any case the audience is limited. This is understandable but lamentable. To change this situation, a very energetic program of translation will be necessary, of works taken from the whole range of his writings. We still lack some basic texts in English (in German there are more) : should there not be at least a volume of Maruyama translations in the Cambridge University series on key texts in political thought? We also need to have many more international symposia, journals, reviews, on political thought in non-Western societies (I think a group is forming in England to pursue this idea) and in general, that would incorporate Maruyama and other seminal modern thinkers. And we need a full-scale intellectual biography of Maruyama. A big, important book will be read.

But you do not want only comments on procedure. The question is, how, substantively, is Maruyama read, and *why read him?* I have tried to give my own answer today. But let me add two concluding thoughts: it is important to read Maruyama because, when I reflect on the "politics" of everyday life, on the social division of labor, especially founded on gender, it seems clear that the "little emperor systems" of which he wrote are still very much with us. After all, the citizen-subject of the state as Maruyama imagined it was male, albeit ascetically so. But what happens to the other half of humanity?

Yet even the most brilliant, most trenchant thinker – and I consider Maruyama to be one – has to stop sometime, leaving those who remain behind faced with a void. We cannot replicate his thought, not least because it was cast in a unique style that was

experientially rich, multi-voiced, playful, and yet skillfully controlled. I myself am a tailor's grandson and happily admit being an academic. But Maruyama was far from being an "academic" writer. In any case, it is left to us now to develop our own styles of thought and expression; we have to move on. But I will always be grateful to have shared a brief time with him here, in this "small country out in the sticks," this "piece of the larger world."

Thank you for your kind attention.

〔編者注記〕

バーシェイ氏の記念講演のための元原稿は、その後、平石直昭丸山文庫顧問の翻訳で、「社会科学史の観点からみた丸山眞男」と題して、『思想』第964号（2004年8月）に掲載された。ただしその際、原文の最初と最後にあった挨拶部分が削られたほか、中身の点でも、著者と訳者とが相談の上で、直訳が与える印象とは異なる表現措辞をしている箇所がわずかながらあることを付記しておく。